The Fractured Gaze: The OECD, the World Bank and a ‘Wicked Problem’

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The concept of global care chains, initially formulated by Arlie Hochschild (2000), points to a complex set of relationships. As Yeates (2005: 5) notes, the concept ‘emanates from a vast (feminist) literature that points to the buoyancy of the international trade in domestic care services and its centrality to the processes and politics of “globalisation” and capitalist dynamism. This trade forges transnational networks between households and families and a set of ties between countries of different levels of “development’. Global care chains can thus be seen as a ‘wicked problem’, i.e. one that can only be adequately dealt with by coordinating action across a number of fields and multiple scales. In this paper, the focus is on how two of the international organisations that play an important role in tendering policy advice to both sending and receiving countries see the issue. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has its eyes primarily on the main receiving countries of the North, although its remit has from the outset included development. It thus deals with all the relevant policy fields – migration, development, and social/care policy, with gender cutting across all three. The World Bank, while based in Washington DC, focuses on the South, using its financial power and ideational resources to promote its vision of development. Over the last fifteen years it has also begun to bring its formidable resources to bear on the question of migration, including the ‘feminisation of migration’.

I argue however that although both organisations see the issue only fragments of the issue. Each capable of ‘seeing’ particular pieces of the problem through distinct lenses provided by its various units, but neither has been able to grasp the connection between them. In other words, each sees the issue through a fractured gaze. Moreover, each organisation ‘sees’ different aspects of the global care chain. Before turning to an analysis of the two organisations, however, the paper discusses the importance of reflecting on how international organisations ‘see’ (or don’t see) the world around them, for how they see the world is critical to understanding how they tackle issues such as those embedded in global care chains.

1 The term comes from British policy debates, inspired by New Public Management, it refers to problems that require coordination across a broad range of jurisdictions (Sabel and O’Donnell, 2001: 76)
2 This paper comes out of a broader project, Gender, Migration and the Work of Care, headed by Ito Peng and funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. It on materials collected from the OECD archives as well as documents available through the OECD and World Bank websites. I would like to thank Kate Bedford for her insightful comments on the first draft. I also received some helpful feedback from the World Bank’s Gender Cross-Cutting Solutions Area, headed by Caren Grown.
3 Kofman and Raghuram (2015: chapter 1) however note that only about 2/5 of migrants from the South reside in OECD countries. Others go to other high income countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Saudi Arabia or ‘emerging’ middle income countries like Argentina and Chile.
I - Seeing Like an IO

Transposing the approach Scott pioneered in his 1998 classic, *Seeing Like a State* to the international scale, Broome and Seabrooke (2012:5) mount a cogent argument for focusing on how international organisations (IOs) perceive the world: ‘By “seeing like an IO”, we can increase our understanding of the cognitive and organizational environment that guides an IO’s actions and informs its policy advice to states, which enables a more comprehensive picture of how the everyday business of global governance works in practice’. As they argue, international organisations like the OECD and the World Bank rely especially on their cognitive authority to influence state actions. Each organisation’s influence, in turn, is dependent on the quality of its analytic institutions - i.e. ‘the specialist units, departments, committees, adjudicating bodies and others housed by or linked to IOs, that develop the cognitive framework for understanding and solving policy problems’ (ibid: 3). The latter are responsible for producing ‘actionable knowledge’, that is, knowledge that aims to identify shared policy problems from which a set of ‘best practice’ solutions can be distilled. Such cognitive authority, however, is not static as established conceptions of best practice can be, and often are, subject to contestation. Rather an IO’s cognitive authority frequently needs to be constructed and reconstructed to meet new challenges. The analytic institutions within each IO have a critical part to play in this regard.

While Broome and Seabrooke see the advantages that accrue to this kind of policy knowledge, like Scott, they are also concerned about the associated tendency to generate generic solutions and a related inability to incorporate important insights from local knowledges. This can indeed pose a problem, especially for analytic institutions centred in the organisation’s headquarters and far from the field. Yet those IOs that possess field offices do come into contact with sources of local knowledge, which may alter how they see the world and thus influence the views they feed back to headquarters. Thus a full account of how an IO sees would follow Bedford’s (2009) approach, which went beyond how the World Bank ‘saw’ gender at its Washington headquarters to probe its discourse and practice at the regional (Latin America and the Caribbean), national (Ecuador and Argentina) and local (project) scales. This brought to light the different ways of seeing at each scale, fashioned in response to the particular intellectual and political environments in which each of the field offices operates. Basok and Piper (2012) similarly make visible the disjuncture that can arise between the rights-based discourse on migration articulated at the headquarters of IOs such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and UNIFEM and the actual concerns of their field offices in four pairs of countries within the Latin America and the Caribbean region.

Such a multi-scalar approach will be taken in future work in the global governance of care and migration. The issue that is of particular concern for this paper however is one raised in Barnett and Finnemore’s classic essay – i.e. that IOs are bureaucracies and as such they are based on the principle of internal specialisation, whereby problems are ‘factored’ into manageable pieces. As a result,
‘different segments of the organization may develop different ways of making sense of the world, experience different local environments, and receive different stimuli from outside; they may also be populated by different mixes of profession or shaped by different historical experiences. All of these would contribute to the development of different local cultures within the organization and different ways of perceiving the environment and the organization’s overall mission’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 724).

For Barnett and Finnemore, the co-existence of different ways of seeing within an IO poses a potential for internal ‘cultural contestations’ which may impede its pursuit of a coherent set of objectives. For our purposes, however, internally differentiated ways of seeing highlight the difficulty that IOs may have in coming to grips with ‘wicked problems’ such as those captured by the concept of global care chains. In other words, they may be structured to ‘see’ pieces of the problem but have difficulty in putting them together and thus are unable to offer comprehensive solutions.

In contrast to the UN organisations, the OECD and the World Bank rely less on the language of rights to establish their claims to authority. Instead both see themselves – and are usually seen by others - as organisations whose authority derives from their cognitive ability which in turn rests on the production and dissemination of policy knowledge. In this, they draw on the policy sciences, especially the discipline of economics, to identify trends, the common problems to which these give rise and the range of appropriate solutions. At the same time, each is organised in such a way that it can grasp pieces of the global care chain puzzle but neither has yet proved capable of seeing the whole. Each has particular strengths and certain blind spots. Thus the OECD has a longer history of monitoring migration, including the collection of sex-differentiated statistics since the 1980s, and it has played an important role in identifying growing care needs of its members (Mahon 2010; 2014). While its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the Development Centre ‘see’ development, neither has observed the adverse impact of global care chains on those left behind. The World Bank is a relative newcomer to the issue of international migration and those charged with reflecting on the complex links between migration and development still operate at the margins of the organisation so that knowledge generated there has not influenced its broader work on gender or social policy. Nevertheless the fact that its gaze is primarily directed at the South has meant that it has done more than the OECD to illuminate the issues posed for sending countries. Its over-riding concern with regard to migration, however, remains the potential of remittances to contribute to development.

II - The OECD

From the outset the OECD’s mandate was to promote economic growth through the liberalisation of trade and investment, to facilitate economic cooperation among its member states and to coordinate the latter’s role in promoting development in the Global South (Schmelzer, 2016). Once considered a ‘rich capitalist countries’ club’, since the 1990s the OECD’s membership has expanded from its traditional core
to include several Eastern European countries, Korea, Mexico, Chile and Israel. It is also involved in various ‘enhanced engagement’ activities with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The OECD does not enjoy the budgetary powers of the World Bank and it has no field offices, although there is a joint OECD/Korea Policy Centre located in Seoul. The United States exercises a degree of influence as the largest contributor to the organisation’s budget and the post of one of the Deputy Secretaries-General is normally occupied by an American. Yet its analytic institutions are centred in its Paris-based Secretariat Europeans outnumber Americans. The various divisions within the Secretariat work with the government officials and technical experts who populate its complex structure of committees and working groups (Woodward, 2009: 7). The European Commission is an active participant in many of these committees and has representation on the Ministerial Council.

For our story, the units involved in ‘seeing’ pieces of the global care chain include the Migration Division and Working Party 2 (WP2) of the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA), DELSA’s Social Policy and Health Divisions and their associated working parties, and the Development Advisory Committee (DAC) and Development Centre. The DAC, in operation since the OECD’s foundation in 1961, brings together most of the OECD’s key donor agencies and has played a critical role in shaping the world of development (Gore, 2013). Unlike the core units of the OECD, the Development Centre includes countries from the Global South. Of its current membership of 47 countries, 21 are ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’. In terms of gender, from 1974-1998 DELSA’s Working Party 6 (WP6) on the role of women in the economy challenged, with some success, the gender blindness of the organisation’s thinking (Mahon, 2015). What is now called GenderNet performs the same role vis-à-vis the DAC, while the Development Centre’s gender and development group prepares the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), which uses a variety of indicators to rank over 100 countries, seen through the lens of ‘discriminatory institutions’.

II.1 - Migration, Development...and Gender?

Migration has been part of the OECD’s remit from the outset although it initially focused on migration among its European members and its Working Party 2 only included the states involved. In 1973 the OECD established its continuous Reporting system on Migration, known by its French acronym, SOPEMI, to monitor the scale and nature of migration. As the old distinction between ‘guest worker’ migration within Europe and migration to the ‘settler’ countries in North America and the Antipodes became increasingly relevant, the latter countries joined the working party. Under pressure from WP6, moreover, SOPEMI began to collect sex-disaggregated statistics in the 1980s. Even before this, however, WP2 had begun to talk of the ‘feminisation of migration’ (OECD, 2011a:8) although the women concerned were seen as family members accompanying the main (male) migrant.

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4 It currently has 34 member countries. The original core was Western European, Canada, and the US, with Japan joining in 1964 and Australia and New Zealand in the early 1970s. Since 1994 it has added the ten new members.
By the 1990s, it was becoming clear to WP2 that intra-OECD migration was becoming less important than the flow of migrants from the South and Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc. Yet no particular note was made of the migration of women from the South to meet care needs in the North, even though feminist scholars had already begun to document the formation of transnational care chains (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Aviva, 1997). A decade later, WP2 began to express concern over member countries’ courting of high-skilled migrants from the South, while blocking avenues for those considered low-skilled. The 2009 High Level Forum on Migration linked the closing of legal avenues for low-skilled workers to the rise in the number of undocumented workers (OECD, 2011a: 14). In 2011, its flagship publication, the *International Migration Outlook*, went further, noting that given the demand for ‘labour intensive personal care occupations’ arising from population ageing and women’s changed roles, blocking avenues for low-skilled workers would simply drive the market underground, fuelling the demand for irregular workers (OECD, 2011a: 15).

While WP2 sees the issues primarily in terms of integration of the migrants into the host countries, DAC and the Development Centre focus on the link between migration and development. In the 1990s, DAC understood the answer to lie in the provision of more effective foreign aid as a means to stem the flow of migrants from the South however a decade later it came to see migration as an important tool for development. With this policy shift came an enhanced concern to achieve ‘policy coherence’ through better coordination of aid, trade and migration policies. The search for policy coherence did not, however, include seeing the sending side of the global care chain. Neither DAC nor its affiliated GenderNET has taken up the issue.

The Development Centre, whose membership includes countries from the South, might have been more likely to see those left behind. A search of its major publications, however, shows that it has paid little attention to this aspect. For instance, *Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries* (Development Centre, 2007: 76-77) included a small section on gender and family roles, which noted that ‘daughters are more likely to remit’ but that many women migrants may be more reluctant to return home, where ‘they may lose new freedoms acquired in the destination country’. In terms of children, remittances may reduce the likelihood of child labour, but their education may also suffer from less parental supervision and stress related to the parent’s absence. Its Gender Unit sees the world through the lens of gendered ‘discriminatory institutions’ in the South. Thus far its only study of migration focused on the impact of such institutions on South-South migration (Ferrant et al, 2014; Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015). The key messages it drew from this were: 1) discriminatory social norms in origin and destination countries influence female migration; 2) higher levels of discrimination in origin countries lead to higher levels of migration, but only up to a point after which discrimination becomes a barrier to migration’; and 3) women tend to migrate to countries with similar or lower levels of discrimination (Ferrant et al, 2014:1).
In 2014, the Gender Unit expanded its discriminatory institutions indicators to include issues such as unpaid care but this did not lead it to see the care needs of those ‘left behind’ nor to reflect on the demand for care workers in receiving countries. For the first time, however, it included OECD countries but not the question of South-North migration. This marked a beginning of a break with the silent assumption that ‘discrimination’ is a problem for the South but not for the OECD core. While noting that the OECD countries ‘demonstrate the importance of sustained investment in gender equality to remove discrimination from social institutions’, it did highlight the following ‘priority areas’ for action: gender norms in paid and unpaid labour (but no comment on the use of migrants to lighten the double burden for women in OECD countries); measures to tackle violence against women; and increasing women’s political voice and public leadership (Development Centre, 2014: 27-28). Despite this move, SIGI continues to reflect a neo-colonial bias ‘in the sense that a higher level of discrimination against women is assumed in societies of the Global South (Liebowitz and Zwingel, 2014:5). As we shall see, this is an assumption it shares with the World Bank.

II.2 - Social Policy: Increased Attention to Care (and Gender) But...

‘Care’, or at least child care – has been on the OECD’s agenda since the 1970s when WP6 first highlighted the need for publicly supported child care (Mahon, 2010). In the 1980s, DELSA’s Working Party 1 (social policy) also began to reflect on growing need for child care to enable lone mothers to work and to address needs arising from population ageing. Thus the document on long term care (MAS/WP1(88)03) prepared for the 1988 social policy ministers’ meeting, noted that ‘changing demographic structures in terms of female labour force participation, divorce and declining birth rates all have important consequences for both the financing of acute and chronic care, as well as the available population to assist the elderly with informal and formal personal care,’ which could mean ‘labour shortages in the generally low-wage, low-prestige long-term care occupational category’ (ibid, 1-2). The study did not however concern itself with who would fill these positions nor how to make them more attractive. Rather, it focused on the need for better coordination of health and social services and the need for new financing arrangements, including incentives to promote informal care.

WP6 took up the issue of who was providing paid and unpaid elder care in the 1990s. The studies it commissioned, however, focused exclusively on the gender of carers (Christopherson, 1997; Jacobzone, 1999; Jenson and Jacobzone, 2000) thus remaining blind to the increasing recourse by its member countries to migrant caregivers, especially among those in Southern Europe. When WP6 was disbanded in 1998, this work was picked up by WP1 and DELSA’s Social Policy Division. The latter, however, has focused its gaze primarily on the child as an investment in human capital and the provision of child care to mitigate tensions between work and family life. Its major thematic study, Babies and Bosses, thus called for the provision of non-parental childcare as a means to reduce work-family pressures. No mention was made of the role migrant care workers were increasingly playing in making such reconciliation possible for women in the North. This may be because countries like France, Italy and
Spain, where a combination of social policies (cash for care) and migration regimes have led to increasingly reliance on migrant care workers, were not included in the study. The countries involved in the study were Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. Among these, until 2015 only Canada had a live in care giver program that supported care-based migration, mainly for elder care although migrants also supply a significant share of child and elder care in Ireland and the UK. Despite this, the Babies and Bosses reports did not see the connection.

The only OECD report on long-term care that explicitly dealt with the position of migrant care workers was produced by another division of DELSA, the Health Division. Help Wanted? Providing and Paying for Long Term Care (Colombo et al, 2011) documented the substantial role that migrants play in the long-term care sector of a number or member countries. Migrant workers account for 50% or more of the long-term care labour force in Austria, France, Italy and Israel (Colombo et al, 2011: 74). They are also over-represented in the home help sector of Greece, Portugal, Spain and France and in the institutional care sector in Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, Finland, the UK, Sweden and Denmark (Ibid: 176). The report did not hesitate to acknowledge their vulnerable position within the host labour markets:

[Migrant care workers] often work with shorter contracts, more irregular hours, broken shifts, for lower pay and in lower classified functions than non-migrant care workers and may have to work with the least favourable care recipients....Uncertainly about immigration rules and their rights may lead them to adhere more closely to employers’ wishes and stay in the job longer than the domestic work force....They may be subject to verbal abuse or outright refusal to be cared for by the client...but they may also experience such behaviour from colleagues and employees....Those in round-the-clock live-in arrangements are especially vulnerable to personal and financial exploitation (Colombo et al, 2011: 175-6).

Like the migration studies referred to above, this study noted that ‘the absence of specific reference in labour migration programmes to the labour needs of the long term care sector is conspicuous’ (ibid: 15). While this study ignored the other end of the care chain, it at least recognised the growing importance of migrant care workers and was critical of the silences in OECD member migration policy as well as the lack of protection afforded migrants by the host countries. The insights Help Wanted has to offer were not, however, picked up the Social Division when the issue of long-term care was raised in the documents prepared for the 2011 social minister’s meetings. In the scant three pages devoted to the issue in Paying for the Past, Providing for the Future: Intergenerational Solidarity (OECD, 2011b) no notice was taken of the role played by migrant care workers.

The OECD’s signature publication on gender, Closing the Gender Gap, coordinated by the Social Policy Division, focused on women’s employment, education and entrepreneurship. It highlighted the importance of good and affordable childcare and a more equal sharing of domestic labour between men and women. Like the 2014 changes to SIGI, it also held the promise of breaking the North South barrier by trying to deal with both. Yet, as Razavi (2014:144) rightly points out, ‘the report’s analysis remains
confusingly segmented between the “OECD countries” and “developing countries”, rather than providing an integrated analysis of the increasingly globalized economies across the traditional “North-South” divide and pointing to both the commonalities and the differences, as well as the interconnections between them’. Thus while the report acknowledges that domestic work constitutes an important, and largely feminised, part of the informal sector in developing countries, it is silent on its growing importance (‘precarious work’) in wealthy OECD countries and that many who work in that sector – and enable the labour force ‘activation’ of women in the Global North – are migrants.

The OECD thus only sees certain parts of the global care chain. Different units are organised to see particular aspects – migration, development, child and elder care – but it does not see the connections between them. In part, the OECD is inhibited from developing a coherent approach to the issues raised by the formation of global care chains because it has internalised a bifurcated North-South view of the world. For the most part, DELSA focuses on ‘domestic’ issues facing OECD member countries, while DAC and the Development Centre deal with the ‘other’ in the South. Yet the latter have thus far failed to make visible the implications of care migration for migrants themselves as well as those ‘left behind’.

III - The World Bank

‘Development’ has been central to the Bank’s mandate since its foundation. Through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), established in 1944, it lends funds for development projects and the International Development Association (IDA), founded in 1960, provides concessional finance to the poorest countries. Both are administered by the same bureaucracy (Hammer, 2013: 9). Unlike the OECD, the Bank plays a direct role in financing development and accordingly has developed a system of field offices, but like the OECD it has come to see itself as a knowledge organisation, perhaps ‘the’ knowledge organisation in the field of development. To cite Hammer again (2013:12), the Bank ‘aims to be the authoritative international voice defining what economic development is and that the development agenda should be. In that capacity, it employs its internal research services and its flagship publication, the World Development Report’.

The Bank’s conception of development has changed over time – from an emphasis on physical infrastructure in the early years, to poverty alleviation and human capital development under the McNamara’s presidency in the 1970s, neoliberal structural adjustment in the 1980s, under Wolfensohn in the 1990s a returning to ‘seeing’ and acting to mitigate extreme poverty (Vetterlein, 2012; Hammer, 2013; Rojas, 2015). Under Jong Kim, the current president the Bank has gone beyond a narrow focus on eradicating extreme poverty to ‘promoting shared prosperity for the bottom 40% of the population of all

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5 Vetterlein (2012) documents the fact that some of those hired during McNamara’s presidency remained with the Bank during the darkest structural adjustment years, and continued to push for consideration of the social dimensions of development.
countries’. While the Bank now draws on institutional economics and other disciplines, neoclassical economics has retained its dominant position. US influence stretches beyond the political clout it enjoys as the largest contributor.6 As Wade (2002: 138) notes:

The large majority of Bank economists have a postgraduate qualification from a North American university, whatever their nationality....The Bank’s location in the heart of Washington...plus the fact that its staff read US newspapers and watch American TV, plus the fact that English is the only language of business, mean that American pressures structure the very mindset with which most staff promote development.

At the same time, smaller countries can have an impact on the Bank’s research program by contributing to dedicated trust funds (Hammer, 2013: 31). Among others, the Nordic countries, Germany and Switzerland have used this method to support research on gender (Miller, 1998: 144-5) and on migration.

The Bank’s research capacity is concentrated in its Washington DC headquarters, with the bulk of the research carried out by the eighty or so economists in the Department of Economics (DEC).7 In addition, from 1996 to 2014, thematically focused work was carried out within five networks,8 the most important for our purposes being Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM), which housed the Gender and Development unit. In addition, the Environmentally and Socially Sustain Development network was home to what Deacon (2007: 27) calls the ‘heretics’ who preferred a more anthropological approach to understanding poverty and addressed the social and political frameworks necessary for poverty alleviation. As we shall see, some ‘heretics’ have also been called on to do research on migration, which is a relatively new theme for the Bank. While the Bank thus includes (some) diverse ways of seeing, it has perhaps been more effective than the OECD in imposing a dominant perspective.9 As Hammer notes, (2013:30) ‘ideas do not become part of the Bank establishment unless they can effectively penetrate the intellectual and organizational domain of the DEC’.10

I.I – Gender – but not Migration

The Bank first began to ‘see’ women during following the 1975 World Conference on Women, with the appointment of a ‘Women in Development’ (WID) advisor in 1977 (Miller, 1998: 148). The first

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6 Voting rights are linked to a country’s share, which reflects the size of its economy. The US retains the largest share with 15.85% even after greater voting rights have been allocated to China. Japan comes second with 6.84 and China 3rd, with 4.42, followed by Germany (4%). (Hammer, 2013: 8).
7 The ‘global practices’ and ‘cross-cutting themes’ that replaced the old network system also contribute and some of this research is commissioned by the regions and by country offices.
8 In 2014 President Jim Yong Kim reorganised the Bank in a process that eliminated PREM and replaced the old networks with a series of ‘global practices’, including poverty, and ‘cross-cutting themes’ including gender. Migration was not singled out in the old structure nor in Kim’s.
9 This is not to suggest that the Economics Department within the OECD has not tried to play the same gatekeeper role as DEC nor that the OECD’s Secretary General has not had recourse to ‘horizontal projects’ in order to impose a certain direction. Yet interviews with key officials outside the Economics Department over the years have indicated a greater scope for diversity. See inter alia Mahon, 2011.
10 On the way in which this is used to maintain the dominant paradigm, see also Wade (1996).
WID guidelines appeared in 1984 - around the same time that the WID established its presence within the OECD’s DAC. By 1987 ‘the WID “office” had grown into a Division with three professionals and... was located in the Population and Human Resources Department,..., maintaining its association with what is seen as a “soft” area in the Bank – human resources and social sector planning’, with external funds accounting for a substantial share of its budget (Miller, 2013: 152). In 1993, in a move reflecting influence of feminist economist, Caroline Moser, the WID Division was replaced by a Gender Analysis and Policy thematic group and housed in the newly created Vice-Presidency for Human Resources Development and Operations Policy (Miller: 156). With the 1996 reorganisation under Wolfensohn’s presidency, it was moved to PREM. Following the most recent reorganisation, it became one of the five ‘cross cutting solutions areas’. 

Mosher’s appointment came in the wake of mounting criticism of the Bank’s structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, including the adverse impact on women. Among others, her work showed how the Bank had relied on women’s unpaid domestic work as a form of ‘shock absorber’. Her Gender Planning Framework, which came to influence how the Bank saw gender, highlighted the connections between women’s productive, reproductive and community management roles and opened the way to the incorporation of time-use surveys as a way of quantifying the unpaid work women do. Quantification, in turn, helped to make the case for gender equality as ‘good for development’ in an organisation that prized - and prizes - quantitative methods and instrumentalist reasoning (Vetterlein, 2013; Bedford, 2009). Gender equality was also translated into terms that fit the Bank’s embrace of the concept of ‘social investment’. Thus for instance Enhancing Women’s Participation in Economic Development (World Bank, 1995:22) noted that ‘Investing in women is critical for poverty reduction. It speeds economic development by raising productivity and promoting the more efficient use of resources; it produces significant social returns, improving child survival and reducing fertility, and it has considerable inter-generational payoffs’. This way of seeing gender also ran through the Bank’s 2007-2010 action plan, Gender Equality as Smart Economics (World Bank, 2006).

The adoption of a ‘gender and development’ (GAD) approach also served to bring men’s role into view. Moser’s aim had been ‘to generate transformative interventions that countered women’s subordination..., but through a relational lens that highlighted microsocial male-female interactions’ (Bedford, 2009:17). Increasingly, however, bringing men into the picture morphed into a concern with...

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11 Moser worked for the Bank from 1990-2000. For an overview of the different positions in the debates at that time see Razavi and Miller (1995).
12 In addition to the Gender Cross Cutting Solutions area (GCCSA), there is a Gender Strategy Team in the International Finance Corporation, a Gender Leadership Council and an Advisory Council on Gender and Development. The GCCSA is supposed to make it easier to link gender experts in both the Bank and the IFC as well as those in the ‘global practices’ units (e.g. those dealing under the Human Development, Equitable Growth and Sustainable Development Vice Presidents
13 This was explicitly acknowledged in a 2000 report Evaluating Gender and Development at the World Bank (cited in Bedford, 2009: 16).
family breakdown and the demonization of Third World men. As Bedford (2009, 21) notes ‘economic crisis was framed as leading to a crisis in gender relations, with women increasingly overburdened and men increasingly violent and destructive given the undermining of their breadwinner role.’ The answer was not to restore a traditional male breadwinner model nor to reverse the effects of structural adjustment - but to ‘empower’ women by removing barriers to their participation in productive labour and to enlist men in the sharing of domestic duties (Bedford, 2009: chapter 1 passim).

The World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development recognised that gender equality was a value in its own right but it continued to stress that economic globalisation was a source of economic opportunities for women, ignoring the fact that ‘the problem is not just women’s exclusion from labour markets but also exploitative and disabling forms of inclusion’ (Razavi, 2012: 194 Emphasis added) – either in the informal economy at home or in low-paid jobs in richer countries. While the report saw that women tend to be concentrated in low paid occupations, no thought was given to policies that would lead to ‘a re-evaluation of the skill content of jobs to increase pay and status of “women’s work”’ (Elson, 2012: 180). In addition, although the report noted that parental leave and child care provision could contribute to the equalisation of the labour market position of men and women, it favoured affordable ‘community-based’ provision over higher-quality early childhood education and care (ECEC) that would also generate more high skilled and better paid jobs. This reflected the Bank’s continuing preference for ‘private’ solutions as well as its preference for ‘educating’ Southern mothers rather than public support for universal ECEC as advocate by the OECD (Mahon, 2016).14

More broadly, as Benería (2012:177) argues, the report failed to deal with the broader ‘care crises’ emerging in both the North and the South. Since Grown, a renowned feminist economist, took over the leadership of the Gender Cross Cutting Solutions Area (GCCSA) in 2014, there has been a greater effort to integrate care into the Section’s work.15 Yet the migration of women from poorer to wealthier countries – both South-North and South-South - to meet such needs, which can in turn lead to ‘care drain’ from the sending country, thus far remains invisible.16 In fact, none of the gender area’s publications acknowledge the existence of global care chains. Thus the gender companion to the 2013 World Development Report: Jobs, Gender at Work refers to the feminisation of migration only once, noting that ‘women who migrate for work have also been shown to send larger amounts of remittances home, and over a longer period compare to male migrants (World Bank, 2014: 7) even though the Development

14 As a glance at the list of Bank-financed projects that highlight women would show, it is women’s maternal role that continues to predominate.
15 Telephone interview with Alica Hammond, Gender Specialist, Gender Cross-Cutting Solutions Area, Washington, DC, 7 March 2016. One example might be the commissioned study of work family reconciliation in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Choda, 2016).
16 I did find one Bank-funded project – JSDF-Indonesia Empowering Women Overseas Migrant Workers (2010-2013) that dealt with women migrants. Run by the TIFA Association, the aim was to support increased use of the official migration process while contributing to ‘capacity building’ among migrant women workers and their families.
Report on Jobs had a whole chapter on work and migration, albeit one that ignored the gender dimension. The issue is also missing from the Bank’s 2016-2023 strategy, Gender Equality, Poverty Reduction and Inclusive Growth (World Bank, 2015). In other words, gender has become part of how the World Bank sees development, but global care chains have not been brought into focus as part of the gender unit’s main business. Moreover when (and where) the Bank did begin to see at least parts of the chain, the understanding of gender outlined above coloured its perceptions.

III.2 - Migration…and Gender: The Orthodox View

While migration was part of the OECD’s remit from the outset, migration was not on the Bank’s radar until the dawn of the new century. It has not been identified in the organisational chart (1996-2014) nor does it hold a prominent position in the structure that emerged under President Jim Yong Kim’s mandate. In 2004, however, following Dilip Ratha’s research that highlighted the importance of remittances, the Bank established a research program on international migration and development, housed in the Development Prospects Group within DEC until recently when it was moved to the Global Indicators Group. The Bank’s new research program sought to illuminate the links between migration and development by focusing on the determinants of migration and its results, ‘brain drain’, temporary migration, and relationships between migration, trade and foreign direct investment (Morrison et al, 2008:1). The overarching concern was with how migration - and, in particular, remittances - could best contribute to development.

A gender dimension was soon added to the Bank’s research as the UN’s sex-disaggregated data showed that women now accounted for approximately half the world’s international migrants. The Bank’s Gender and Development unit in PREM, with funding from the Norwegian and Swedish governments, collaborated with the International Trade Unit of the Development Research Group to produce The International Migration of Women (Morrison et al, 2008). The aim was to do the ‘analytical work that can shape policies to economically empower women migrants as well as women left behind by men’s migration’ with the hope that this would ‘lead to policies that boost productivity, raise incomes and improve welfare in sending and receiving countries’ (Morrison et al, 2008:x). In other words, like other contemporary ‘international migration narratives’ (Pécoud, 2015), the Bank’s research sought to bring out the ‘win-win’ potential of migration, including its gendered aspects.

While noting that women tend to spend in ways that yield better child outcomes – reduction in child labour, education, and nutrition – the report suggested this was more likely where women were the

18 ‘The World Banker and his Cash Return Home’ New York Times, 17.03.08.
recipients because men might (mis)spend the money remitted by their wives. Here it drew (selectively) on aspects of Ehrenreich and Hochschild’s path-breaking (2003) volume, to highlight that:

Numerous examples of migrant women exercising limited control over the allocation of household expenditures are provided in Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003). Various contributors describe cases where women return home after spending several years abroad only to find that their husbands did not spend the remittances they sent on additional education for their children or on building a larger house, but instead used them mostly for his own needs. (Morrison et al, 2008: 189)

It also cites that volume in support of the thesis that Southern women may use migration to escape abusive relationships with their husbands (ibid, 186; 191-2). Although migration might thus contribute to women’s empowerment, this could come at the expense of child well-being: ‘Examples are...provided in Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) of children who grow up without their mother being severely depressed, particularly if the mother left them when they were young’ (ibid: 194).

These broad-brush references to Ehrenreich and Hochschild’s co-edited volume reveal a selective reading of the chapters, one largely blind to the situation in receiving countries and guided by the trope of poor ‘patriarchal’ Southern men whose wounded masculinity leads to perverse behaviour. The report focused on the examples that fit the image, while completely ignoring counter-examples provided in the book. Thus while Salazar Parreñas (2003: 51) discusses some cases where children suffered from their mother’s absence, she also notes that ‘these children do not necessarily become “delinquent,” nor are their families necessarily broken...’ The assumption that a mother’s absence is likely to adversely affect her children is one example of the kind of error that such abstract ways of seeing can lead to. As Raghuram (2012: 164) has pointed out, ‘in many countries the nuclear family may not be the norm and extended families may be commonplace....Many women may thus be involved in care distribution which means that the migration of one woman does not have as great an impact on care’.

More broadly, the report ignored a number of other important arguments made in the volume about the nature of the relationships on which global care chains rest. It thus failed to note that demand for migrant care workers is linked to ‘the marked failure of First World governments to meet the needs created by its women’s entry into the workforce’ (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003: 8); that the employment relationship was hardly egalitarian as Northern women hire women migrant care workers ‘as mistress and maid, employer and employee, across a great divide of privilege and opportunity’ (ibid, 11); and that male unemployment in the South was often the result of Bank-supported structural adjustment policies (ibid: 11).

The report also took up temporary migration, a potential issue of contention between sending and receiving countries. While the latter need workers to fill current labour market needs, they are loathe to incur the social and fiscal costs associated with settlement. While temporary workers may fill short term needs, the fear is that they will ‘overstay’ their visas and add to the growing number of undocumented workers. The report addresses this concern by referring to Mode IV of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), arguing that perhaps migrant women might be the best candidates of Mode IV type of agreement, from the standpoint of Northern states concerned to ensure that migration under this clause remains temporary. As the report counsels, migrant women are more attached to their children and are therefore more likely to return when their contracts expire (Morrison et al 2008: 196). In addition, by taking such jobs, migrant women enable ‘the more educated native-born women in the destination countries to enter the labor force’ and thus boost productivity (ibid: 198). Finally (and naively) the report suggests that female migrants themselves would benefit from the export of services under Mode IV as compared to the standard temporary migration agreement because the ‘contracts would be between host-country employers (firms or households) and foreign firms employing source country migrant women, rather than between host-country employers and migrant women. This would tend to reduce the likelihood of abuse of female migrants by their employers (Ibid: 198). This statement ignores the potential for exploitation by recruitment firms.

Thus in this report, the Bank did capture a dimension of global care chains missing from the OECD’s gaze – what happens to those ‘left behind’ – to the extent that it was concerned with how gender influenced the way remittances were used, with particular attention to their impact on child development and wellbeing. Its understanding, however, was screened through stereotypes of irresponsible Southern men versus ‘good mothers’ who invest in their children, whose absence might psychologically harm their children.

III.3 – The (Partial) Incorporation of ‘Heretical’ Views

The very novelty of the Bank’s concern with migration has forced it to draw on outside experts, which has opened the way to recruitment of ‘heretics’. This section examines a report drafted by a researcher, Irena Omelaniuk, on a one year secondment from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and a literature review by Anjali Fleury commissioned by KNOMAD (Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development), the unit, headed by Dilip Rathat that is currently responsible for leading the Bank’s work on migration. Although KNOMAD is located in the Bank’s ‘knowledge centre’ (DEC), it ‘draws on experts from all parts of the world to synthesize existing knowledge and generate new knowledge for use by policy makers in sending and receiving countries’ and ‘works in close cooperation with the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the Global Migration Group’ (http://www.knomad.org/aboutus, accessed 10 January 2016). Its general work is financed by a trust.

19 At present this provision it limited to ‘temporary, skilled, contractual service providers engaged in intra-firm movement’ (Betts and Nicolaides, 2009:1) but it has the potential to liberalise the flow of temporary ‘economic’ migrants.

20 KNOMAD’s recourse to an independent expert on gender and migration, Anjali Fleury, is not atypical. For instance, its study on human rights indicators and migration (2015) was prepared by Pablo C. Cernadas from the UN Committee on the Protection of Rights for All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, and Michele Levoy and Lilana Keith from the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM). KNOMAD (2015: iii).
fund to which the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’ are the largest contributors, although the Swedish government helped to fund KNOMAD’s study of gender and migration.

Both Omelaniuk (2006) and Fleury (2016) ‘see’ the whole length of the global care chain. For Omelaniuk, ‘women are referred to as the “servants of globalization” because many go abroad to serve families of higher social status, while they pass their own caring role to other family members or less fortunate women in their countries of origin’. For Fleury (2016: 10-11),

A chain occurs with increasing women’s labor force participation, whereby employed women hire other women as domestic helpers and caretakers, who then rely on other women, such as their mothers, female relatives, or eldest children, to care for their families, potentially keeping them out of economic or educational opportunities. The provision of care is not highly valued socially or economically, resulting in lower pay and fewer rights, regulations and contracts protecting care workers, and at the lowest link of the chain, care is often not compensated...Although the transfer of caregiving to lower-status women provides economic opportunities to women, the global care chain continues to rely on the gendered role of caregiving and does not address governments’ or employers’ roles in response to the new need for family care...

As a result, both bring into view issues arising in, and responsibilities of, both sending states and receiving states.

Both recognise that unequal gender relations contribute to the decision to migrate while also recognising that economic, social and political relations in the sending countries vary in important ways. Differences in social relations also shape who cares for those left behind, including who receives remittances and how they are used. Fleury in particular takes up the issue of children left behind, noting that relations can be difficult despite recourse to Skype and Internet, but like Parreñas, she adds that the children ‘do better when their mother’s work and sacrifice are highlighted positively and when they have stable caregivers and frequently interact with their mothers (2016: 29). Governments can play a role here promoting in increased public awareness of migrants’ contribution to their families, communities and society. Fleury’s report also stresses the provision of resources to support those left behind. Both consultants also saw a role for states in sending countries. Omelaniuk (2006: 15) and Fleury (2016: 32-33) underline the need to provide information and training to migrants as well as to labour attachés, with the latter trained to provide support and advice for their nationals abroad. Sending states can play a role in negotiating fair contracts and covering the costs of monitoring them (Omelaniuk, 2006:15) but it is also important to regulate and monitor recruitment agencies (Fleury, 2016: 33).

Whereas Morrison et al’s (2008) study largely ignored inequalities in the receiving countries, Omelaniuk and Fleury recognise the gender bias in the care jobs for which women migrants are recruited and the resulting low pay. They call attention to the way domestic work is often exempted from the protection of labour legislation. It is Fleury, however, who takes up these issues specifically in her recommendations. Thus she argues that host governments should regulate work hours, health and other social protections for domestic workers and monitor their working conditions (2016: 33). They should
eliminate immigration laws and practices that discriminate against women and make work permits not dependent on a specific employer at least in case of abuse or exploitation (ibid:33). Migrant women should receive the same protections, standards and access to services, including health services, as non-migrants (ibid: 32).\footnote{This is also one of the reforms suggested in the study done for the Asia and Pacific Region (Ahsan et al, 2014: 136-137), \textit{International Migration and Development in East Asia and the Pacific}. In his foreword to the study, the Vice President for the region, A. van Trotsenburg also noted that labour receiving countries ‘should consider adopting policies for the equal treatment of migrant workers to avoid creating incentives for employers to displace local workers with cheaper foreign ones. Programs to upgrade the skills of local workers can offset negative distributional consequences....’ (World Bank, 2014: xiii).} Finally in addition to ratifying conventions designed to protect migrants and domestic workers – which few receiving countries have done – the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to 189 countries have acceded, includes general recommendation #26 on women migrant workers which can be used by migrant workers and their advocates to press for their rights.

It is important to remember, however, that both reports were produced by consultants, not regular full time staff. Thus, unlike the ‘heretics’ hired during McNamara’s presidency nor feminist scholars like Moser or Grown who became senior employees of the Bank, they are not in a position to build the kind of internal alliances needed to challenge the reigning orthodoxy. Ormelaniuk’s thoughtful study thus had no impact on the later work done by Morrison et al. KNOMAD does seem to be a site that is open to what the heretics would make visible, but although it is housed in DEC, it is not clear that KNOMAD will be able to expand the Bank’s field of vision of the link between migration and development. The Bank’s main preoccupation remains the use its financial expertise to explore ways to make remittances work for development, as it understands the latter process.

\textit{Conclusion}

With the exception of the two studies commissioned by the Bank, which remain marginal to its vision, neither the Bank nor the OECD ‘see’, and thus try to address, the complex of issues embedded in the concept of global care chains. There are however differences in which parts they see and how they interpret these, differences that reflect each organisation’s primary concerns.

The OECD’s main field of vision remains its member states and the complex of (domestic) problems they have in common. Of its various units, the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA) has the potential to put some of the pieces together to the extent that it includes in its remit social, health and immigration policy. Nevertheless, its social policy division ‘sees’ the issue of child care in a way that combines concerns for child development and gender equality but is oblivious to the way (some) member countries are relying on migrant care workers to fill some of these needs. In at least one report the Health Division has ‘seen’ the issue of elder care, including the poor pay and working conditions which will make it hard to recruit sufficient care workers needed in these ageing societies while
the Immigration Division has noted the problem posed by member states’ focus on skilled workers as the expense of ‘unskilled’ workers, including those providing elder and child care. Thus far, however, these three divisions have not been working together to reflect on effective and equitable solutions for receiving countries. Like the World Bank, those parts of the OECD charged with ‘seeing’ development – DAC and the Development Centre - have come to recognise the growing role played by remittances but despite the existence of gender units linked to both of these, hardly any attention has been paid to the ‘feminisation of migration’ and the ‘care drain’ this can create in sending countries.

The World Bank, with its main focus on development, is concerned with the impact of remittances on the South and has reflected on gender differences in the stability of remittances and in the way these are used. In the earlier work done by the old gender division, women were understood to be likely to remit a greater share of their earnings and to invest this in their family, especially in their children.

“Emasculated’ Southern men, however, were seen as an impediment to such investment, reflecting the neo-colonial assumptions that have filtered into the Bank’s discourse on gender and development. More broadly, it saw this as a win-win situation: Southern women escape patriarchal attitudes at home and earn better wages than they could there; women in rich countries are freed to take productive jobs fitting their educational backgrounds; poor countries earn foreign exchange and can benefit from the ‘modern’ ideas brought by the diaspora; and rich countries get low cost temporary workers to fill meet labour market shortages, and need not worry that such workers will stay as women are committed to their families hence likely to return home. While the Gender Cross-Cutting Solutions Area under Grown has paid more attention to care needs, it has thus far ignored the question of migration. KNOMAD seems to be more open to seeing global care chains, at least through the work done by consultants. For the most part however, there is no evidence that the Bank encourages sending states to support their migrants and those left behind. It also largely ignores the vulnerable position of migrant carers, especially those working in private households, and thus the need for policy changes in receiving countries in both the North and the South.

We might conclude by reflecting on what, for the most part, is not ‘seen’ by either IO. Here Pécout’s (2015: 119) comment seems especially relevant:

One could argue that “unattractive” jobs could be made more attractive (thanks to higher wages or better work conditions), which would benefit those who occupy them (whether immigrant or national). One could contest that certain jobs are only for women and one could challenge the logic according to which women’s access to the labour market makes it necessary to recruit foreign nannies. One could point to the social or psychological costs of the mobility of these “servants of globalisation”.

This is not to say that such solutions are completely invisible. Thus before it was eliminated, OECD’s WP6 certainly tried to challenge the low value attached to caring occupations and the OECD’s Starting Strong studies strongly recommended public support for universal, affordable ECEC (Mahon, 2010). The studies commissioned by the World Bank, especially Fleury’s, try to draw attention to ways of protecting
the rights of migrant care workers and their families while also improving their working conditions. Yet these insights are confined to the margins – at least thusfar.

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